Ballots, Bullets, and Bargains: American Foreign Policy and Presidential Elections by Michael H. Armacost

Author:Michael H. Armacost [Armacost, Michael H.]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: International Relations, Diplomacy, National, United States, Campaigns & Elections, 20th Century, Political Science, Political Process, Americas (North; Central; South; West Indies), American Government, History, General
ISBN: 9780231539135
Google: QwbSBgAAQBAJ
Goodreads: 26262944
Publisher: Columbia University Press
Published: 2015-08-04T00:00:00+00:00

Deferring Tough Calls

The prospective end of an incumbent president’s tenure may indeed encourage him to leave tough problems to his successor “like a land-mine in a field of weeds.” In his account of farewell visits with Harry Truman and Dean Acheson in late 1952, George Kennan recalled wryly, “They had in their eyes, the faraway look of men who know that they are about to be relieved of heavy responsibilities and who derive a malicious pleasure in reserving their most bitter problems for those who are about to displace them.”23

Eisenhower refused to authorize armed U.S. intervention when the French were run out of Indochina in 1954. Yet when he met with John Kennedy during the transition in mid-December 1960, he insisted that forceful intervention might now be necessary. “If the situation is so critical,” Kennedy responded, “why didn’t you decide to do something?”

“I would have,” Ike replied, “but I did not feel I could commit troops with a new administration coming to power.”24 So he punted, but not without a stern warning to Kennedy about the potential costs of inaction. He did the same, as we shall see, with respect to plans for covert action against Castro. It is easier, evidently, to recommend tough actions if someone else will be held accountable for their execution.

At the time, Kennedy’s more immediate preoccupation was with a neighbor of Vietnam. He sought to get “some commitment from the outgoing administration as to how they would deal with Laos … particularly … some idea as to how prepared they were for military intervention.”25 In response, Eisenhower described Laos extravagantly as “the cork in the bottle of the Far East. If Laos is lost to the free world, in the long run we will lose all of Southeast Asia.… You are going to have to put troops in Laos. With other nations if possible—but alone if necessary.”26

This advice was especially unwelcome. Even before the meeting, the president-elect had commented to Ted Sorensen, “Whatever’s going to happen in Laos, an American invasion, a Communist victory or whatever, I wish it would happen before we take over and get blamed for it.”27

Only sixty days later, JFK declared to a nationwide television audience, “Laos is far away from America, but the world is small. Its own safety runs with the safety of us all …”—tougher language than Ike had ever publicly used.28 But Kennedy by no means slavishly followed Eisenhower’s advice. He pursued a negotiated coalition arrangement in Laos, a course that Ike had opposed firmly.

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